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As was indicated in appellant's brief this is an appeal
from a judgment allowing plaintiff's Motion for a Summary Judgment against the Amended Counterclaim of
the defendant and dismissing the same with prejudice.
Appellant contends that the fourth paragraph of plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (R-12), and the
subject-matter of point 4 of appellant's brief herein, was
not properly before the trial court in said motion because
a different division of the trial court had previously ruled
on the matter in plaintiff's unsuccessful Motions to Dismiss Defendant's Appeal and to Dismiss Defendant's
Counterclaim. Respondent admits "No argument was
made upon this point at the time of hearing the motion
for Summary Judgment, since, as was explained to the
court, the matter had been previously submitted in a
former hearing."
None-the-less respondent continues to argue the
point in his brief. Without admitting that this point
is properly before this court appellant asks leave of the
court to briefly reply to respondent's argument.
In this instance it is significant that the authority
cited by the respondent as his justification for bringing
fully adjudicated matters repeatedly before the trial
court is given as Burt & C arlquist Co. \·. J/ arks, et al,
53 Utah 77, 177 P 224 (1918). In this complex land
transaction the original suit for breach of contract \\·as
brought in the city court. The seller brought a cross
cornplaint in the district court for more than the jurisdiction of the city court for damages allegedly sustained
when an agent for sale of a farm employed another firm
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as agent, which sold the farm in excess of the minimum
demand, pocketing the difference. The district court
was held not to have exceeded its jurisdiction on appeal
by permitting of an1ended counterclaim, trying issues
presented by it, and rendering judgment thereon for a
sum in excess of amount that the city court had jurisdiction to try and determine. The court said :
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"Here the city court, as stated, had jurisdiction
of the subject-matter of the action as the same
was commenced and tried in that court. And the
district court had original and concurrent jurisdiction with the city court . . . for the subject
matter of the action. It also had original jurisdiction of the claim for $660 the subject-matter
of the cause of action in the counterclaim."
Manifestly, jurisdiction to enable a valid judgment must
be had by the court irrespective of objections or waivers
on the part of the litagents.
As Judge Martin Larson announced from the bench,
in rejecting respondent's argument herein repeated,
I-lardy v. Meadows, et al, 71 Utah 255, 264 P 968 (1928)
is clearly distinguishable from the instant fact situation.
In the Hardy Cs. a counterclaim was filed in the city
court beyond the jurisdiction of that court and it was
held:
" ... when the inferior court is without jurisdiction . . . the district court to which the case is
appealed does not acquire jurisdiction ... "
In the instant case appeal was effected from a default
judgment in the city court to the district court where
a trial de novo* was thus commenced and original juris-
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diction of the court was had. At this stage in the proceedings a counterclaim was allowed. This is quite
another thing. To quote the above referred to case:
"In the one a cause of original, and in the other
of a derivative, jurisdiction is invoked."
Within one year after the Hardy v. Meadows case
the same court handed down its decision in Moss v.
Taylor, 73 Utah 227, 273 P 515 ( 1928). In this case
plaintiff secured a judgment against defendant in the
district court for ( 1) personal injuries (2) auto damages.
Plaintiff had been assigned the cause of action for auto
damages after judgment had been rendered in the city
court thereon in an action by other parties by one who
had appealed the city court judgment to the district
court. In holding that such was assignable the court said:
"When an appeal is taken to the district court
from a judgment rendered in the city court such
judgment ceases to be in any sense a final judgment. Unless the appeal is dismissed a trial de
novo must be had in the district court. The
pleadings in the district court may be amended
in all respects in the same manner and upon the
sa1ne terms as are provided for amendments of
pleadings in cases originally commenced in the
district court."
*Harris v. Barker, ( 1932) 80 Utah 21, 12 P2 577, " . . . appealing from
the judgment . . . (from city court) to the district court where the case
was triable de novo."

f. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 73 (m) "All causes appealed to the
district court shall be heard anew . . . "
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This rule has been accepted by this court and is
incorporated into the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 73(m).
"All causes appealed to the district court shall
be heard anew. Pleadings may be amended in
all respects in the same manner and upon the
same terms as pleadings in cases originally commenced therein."
Respondent admits that Rule 13(k) of the above Rules
invokes original jurisdiction of the district court because
the cause is "transferred prior to judgment." We submit
that Rule 73 (m) invokes that same original jurisdiction.
An appealed city court judgment is no more a final
judgment than the original cause of action in the city
court.
Under the heading of 'Compulsory Counterclaims'
this court has instructed in Rule 13 (a) as follows:
"A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any
claim which at the time of serving the pleading
the pleader has against the opposing party, if it
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing parties claim
and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction ... "
Appellant submits that she is under obligation to so
counterclaim at the peril of losing her effective cause
of action against the plaintiff.
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